Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

1977

A New Role for Linguistic Philosophy in Education with an
Application to the Field of Learning Disability
Robert Clinkert
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Clinkert, Robert, "A New Role for Linguistic Philosophy in Education with an Application to the Field of
Learning Disability" (1977). Dissertations. 1519.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/1519

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1977 Robert Clinkert

A NEW ROLE FOR LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY IN EDUCATION
WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE FIELD OF
LEARNING DISABILITY

by
Robert John Clinkert

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

May

1977

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge Professor Walter
Krolikowski of Loyola University for rekindling in him an interest in
linguistic philosophy and for demonstrating the value of linguistic
analysis in education.
The author wishes to especially acknowledge Professor fil:lward
Maziarz of Loyola University for illuminating the road to a reconciliation among the three Wittgensteins and between the two godheads.

It

was Professor Maziarz who taught the author that philosophy must be done
dialogically, between the self and the other.·
'Jhe author was introduced to empiricism by Professor Anlold
Levison at Chicago Circle.

It was also at Chicago Circle that the

author first became acquainted with ordinary language analysis especially
in Professor Irving 'Ihalberg's lectures in philosophical psychology and
philosophy of mind.
While studying the philosophical implications of the theory of
relativity and foundations of mathematics under Professor Henry Mehlberg
at the University of Florida, the author came under the influence of
logical positivism.

It was also at the University of Florida that the

author had the opportunity to study philosophy of mind under Charles
Morris who introduced the author to semiotic and the pragmatism of Mead.
ii

During his years at the University of Florida, the author met
the positivist Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and the ordinary
analyst Wittgenstein of the Investigations.

lan~age

It was at Loyola, however,

that the author was introduced to a new Wittgenstein under the guidance
of Professor Maziarz.

It was also at Loyola that the author was given

a new view of American pragmatism by Professor Robert Barry.

iii

To Bob, Jack, and Jane that they may
better know the two godheads; and to
Eleanor who I never knew.

VITA
'Ihe author, Robert John Clinkert, is the son of Willirun Louis
Clinkert and Veronica (Sokolik) Clinkert.

1942 in Chicago.

He was born on January 16,

He presently resides in Glen Ellyn, Illinois with

his wife, Delores, and his three children: Robert, Jack, and Jane.
His elementary education was obtained in Chicago and he received his secondary education from Fenwick High School in Oak Parle,
Illinois where he was graduated in June, 1960.
He received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Philosophy in June,

1967 from the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle.

In August,

1970 he received a Master of Arts degree in Mathematics from Stetson
University in DeLand, Florida.

Since that time, he has completed ex-·

tensive postgraduate study in philosophy at the University of Florida.
He has also'completed postgraduate work in education at Rollins College
in Winter Parle, Florida and in mathematics at the Illinois Institute of
Technology in Chicago.

He entered Loyola University of Chicago to be-

gin his doctoral studies in September, 1973.

His work at Loyola was

concentrated in the fields of foundations of education, philosophy,
curriculum, and educational administration.
He taught mathematics and physics for three years at the high
school level in Seminole County, Florida.

Afterwards, he taught math-

ematics and philosophy of science for a year at the College of Orlando
v

in Orlando, Florida.

He also taught logic for a year at Valencia Com-

munity College in Orlando, Florida.

Since that time, he has served as

an elementary school principal for two years in Mount Prospect, Illinois.
During the last two years he has served as the Assistant Superintendent
for Instruction of Woodridge School District 68 in Woodridge, Illinois.
One of his duties is to ad.minister the special education services of the
school district.

It was in this capacity that he became interested in

the study of lea:r.:ning disabilities.
In July, 1976 he was awarded a financial grant under Title IVc
of the Elementary and Secondary Etlucation Act to establish a program of
early identification and intervention of learning handicaps for his
school district.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.
LIFE ••••

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

•

I

I

•

•

e • • •

I

I

I

•

•

•

9

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

•

I

I

I

I

e

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

•

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

•

I

I

I

I

I

I

•

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

ii
v

Chapter

I.

THE ROLE OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY IN EDUCATION ••••••••• ,.

1

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A Reinterpretation of Jh.ilosophy and the History of
Jh.ilosoplly . .......................................... .
'Ih e L i.rlgui sti c 'IU.n1. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •.
Science . ............................................. .

1

2

5
6
Mathematics ••••••••••••
6
Psychology . .......................................... . 7
HllillaJli ties . .......................................... . 10
Religion . ............................................ . 10
Metaphysics and Theology •••.••••••.••••••
17
I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

a

I

I

...........

A New Definition of 'Man' •••••.••••••••••••••• , ••••••• 22

The Reunification of CuITiculum •.••.•••••••••..••••• 27
The Function of Jh.ilosophy in El:lucation ••••.•••••••• 29
II.
III.

THE THEORY OF LEARNING DISABILITY: A PRE-SCIENCE ••

Ji

A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF THE DEFINITIONS AND MODELS
OF LEARNING DISABILITY. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

36

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
The De Jure Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
The De Facto Definition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4t

Competing Models and Their Efficacy in Remediation. • • • 44
Stlm.mary • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 49

IV.
V.

FORMULATING A PREDICTIVE HYPOTHESIS: THE SE1'1IOTICAL
MODEL OF LANGUAGE DISABILITY •••••••••••••••••••••••••

....

51

TESTING A HYPOTHESIS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF LANGUAGE
COMPETENCE IN NORMAL AND LEARNING DISABLED CHILDREN. • • • • • 59
Introduction . ................................. .

Hypotheses Tested •••.•.
vii

........... ..... ........

....... 59
I

I

I

I

I

I

I

61

Subjects •..•.
Procedure •...
Instruments •••
Results •.•.•.
Discussion •.
Conclusion •.
VI.

............. ........ .....
61
...
62
...
... .... •, 62
... 63

......
... ...

..... ...
............

... ....

REFLECTING ON THE LANDSCAPE: THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY IN
E!DUCA'TI ON • •••••••••••••••••••

BIBLI(X';RAPHY . .•.••..•.•.........•.

viii

I

•

•

1'

•

,

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

67
68

70
73

In the beginning was the word • • ,
The Holy Bible

CHAPTER I

THE ROLE OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY
IN EDUCATION
Introduction
A new role of philosophy in education is to guide a reconstruction of the history of philosophy as well as a reconstruction of all of
the educational disciplines on the basis of "the linguistic tum" which
can be described as: the ontological attitude that only language exists,
Taking "the linguistic tum" suggests a new criterion of meaning
which displaces the empiricist criterion of meaning.
of adopting this new linguistic attitude are:

Among the results

a new definition of 'man' ;

a new distinction between science and the humanities; and a reinterpretation of the value and meaning of metaphysics, theology, and religion.
A paradigm application of "the linguistic tum" in the foundations of education can be shown by an analysis of the field of special
education and of leaming disability in particular.
The role of philosophy in education, apart :from history of philosophy, has been the application of the "philosophical method" or "philosophical attitude,"

This attitude consists in questioning implicit

assumptions and in using language in a specifiably cautious manner.
1

2

Some of the assumptions which might be questioned, for example,
are value assertions such as 'Xis a valuable topic to include in the
curriculum' •

What is in question here, is the meaning of the term 'edu-

cationally valuable'.

The recent humanist-materialist debate in curric-

ulum construction is evidence of the different meanings that can be
attached to -this terrn.. 1
The philosophical method further requires that we be forever
circumspect in our use of language.

Typical imperatives in this regard

are: define terms unambiguously and avoid the logical fallacies.
One of the legacies of philosophy to education and to human
endeavor in general, can aptly be called "metaphysical semantics."

Meta-

physical semantics is a way of extracting new meaning from language by
taking a new ontological perspective.

The concept of metaphysical seman-

tics blurs the classical distinction between epistemology and ontology.
Epistemology is thereby regarded as the study of the meaning of language,
and ontology is regarded as the description of designata in their relationship to signs.
A Reinterpretation of Philosophy and the History of Philosophy
A brief review of the history of philosophy from this new vantage
point demonstrates how the great philosophical systems can be reinterpreted as disguised attempts to posit metaphysical-semantical theories, that
is, as disguised recommendations to revise the use of language.
1Herbert Feigl, "The Scientific Outlook: Naturalism and Humanism,"
in Readin s in the Philoso h of Science, eds. Herbert Feigl and May
Brodbeck New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 8-18.

3
Plato's eternal forms, for example, provided man with a new, but
misleading, picture of the relationship between language and reality.
Here the term 'reality' is to be defined from the perspective of metaphysical semantics as 'that which language designates'.

Plato's rec-

ommended revision of language was that terms be treated as though they
had an essential meaning.
Aristotle's categories strengthened the belief that we can eventually arrive at the "real" definition of terms, if we correctly apply
the classification procedure of genus and differentia.
'Ihe British Empiricists argued that our language is meaningful
only insofar as our terms are based on sensation experiences,

Hume's

dictum to burn all in our libraries not based on this criterion of meaning stands as testimony to the linguistic character of British Empiricism.
During contemporary times, three new language oriented, philosophical outlooks are being assimilated into education: Logical Positivism, American Pragmatism, and Ordinary Language Analysis.
Logical Positivism has renewed interest in the structure of language.

Its most perceptible influence on education has been in mathe-

matics and in science.

Mathematics is now regarded as an abstract lan-

guage based on logic.

'Ihe use of the empiricist criterion of meaning in

science has, at last, turned the course of science from the path of Aristotelian essentialism to the productive path of verificationism,

4
American Pragmatism has replaced the European monarchial, classroom attitude of privileged access to knowledge with a democratic view
which elevates the ontology of ordinary society to the highest level of
philosophical acceptability.

The contribution of pragmatism to philos-

ophy has been its analysis of language as a social phenomenon which is
based on a communitarian ontology.

1

Ordinary Language Analysis is the most recent entry into education, but it has appeared almost exclusively at the theoretical level,
in philosophical studies of education.

Contemporary ordinary language

analysts, such as Hirst and Peters, are attempting to redefine such
terms as 'education' by analyzing the ordinary language used to describe
the acts of teaching and learning.

The result of such redefinition is

to restrict the use of educational terminology to conform with ordinary
use,
It is thus possible to reconstruct the history of philosophy,
from antiquity to contemporary times, in such a way that,given any :rhil~sophical

system whatever, it can be reinterpreted to be a proposal to

reform the use of language.

According to this linguistic perspective:

ethics concerns the meaning of 'good'; aesthetics concerns the meaning
of 'beauty'; epistemology concerns the meaning of 'meaning'; logic is
concerned with linguistic transformations; philosophy of science deals
with the clarification of the various object languages used in science
1Professor Robert Barry, Philosophical Lectures in American Pragmatism, Loyola University of Chicago, Fall Semester, 1975,

5
and the logico-empirical rules of inference used by scientists; and metaphysics is the attempt to characterize the range of referents which language can designate.

Philosophy, therefore, is (and always has been)

about language.
According to the view of metaphysical semantics, we can stipulatively define the three contemporary philosophical systems as follows:
pragmatism is the study of the bio-social basis of language, logical
positivism is the study of language verification, and ordinary language
analysis is the study of language criteriology,
'!he Linguistic Turn
It should be noted that throughout this study all propositions
about language can be extended beyond verbal language to nonverbal language,

This extension has been called "semiotics" which is the study of

sign process,

Nonverbal languages would include the gestural languages

used by animals and the symbolic language exhibited in the honeybee dance,
The blind, deaf mute thus acquires a haptically based language of signs.
In order for educators to effectively use linguistic philosophy,
they must accept a linguistically based reconstruction of the history of
philosophy.

The value of this acceptance does not lie in its historical

character, however, but in the new perspective suggested by the reinterpretation.

This new vantage point will induce the habit of viewing all

problems and educational disciplines as having an important linguistic
component.
exists.

The educator must, at times, behave as though only language

Accepting this perspective is to take "the linguistic tum."

6
What follows are numerous examples of making explicit

thos~

as-

pects of educational disciplines which are linguistically based.
Science
(a) Materialism in science consists in the scientist adopting
the material idiom while he is in the laboratory.

He adopts the "thing

language" as his linguistic framework because that particular mode of
speaking has been most successful in prediction and postdiction.

We

must not take the scientist's use of the physicalist language as evidence that he necessarily embraces materialism as an ontology, but rather that he has decided to employ a way of speaking that is pragmatically
useful.
(b) '!he theory of relativity can be regarded as an attempt to
redefine 'simultaneity' and 'congruence' in such a way that our ordinary
definition of causality continues to apply as a description of events in
noninertial frames of reference.
(c) Assertions about theoretical entities such as forces, antineutrinos, specific gravity, and solubility can be translated into observational predicates which refer to meter readings and so on.
{d) In biology, statements about genes can be taken as shorthand
expressions for probability statements about the likelihood of an offspring exhibiting a trait.
Mathematics
(a) Mathematics can be regarded as an instrument for making

7
explicit those aspects of empirical theories which are implicit in, the
premises.

Mathematics is thus an auxiliary calculus which assists us

in making linguistic transformations within our empirical theories.
(b) The "language" of mathematics (for example, field equations)
is useful in describing empirical phenomena because mathematical and empirical constructions exhibit many of the criteria of thinghood such as
conservation and continuity.
(c) Mathematics can also be viewed as a formal syntactical system
that is composed of empty tautologies which are uninterpreted (meaning
free).

Mathematics is thereby regarded as a set of transformative rules

of inference governing the conventions we use to replace one string of
symbols with another.
Psychology
(a) Classical disputes in psychology need not be regarded as being about matters of fact, but can be considered to be disguised disagreements about alternative descriptions of matters of fact.

For example,

instead of arguing that there is no such thing as the subconscious, the
disputant should stipulate, "We do not wish to use the phrase 'subconscious thought' but prefer to reserve the word 'thought' for what Freud
called 'conscious thought' • "
(b) Philosophical psychology has revealed that statements about
psychological states are tangles of linguistic confusions and that psychological claims about emotions can be clarified by ordinary language

8
analysis.

Typically, for example, psychologists reduce the statement

'He is angry' to 'He is engaging in characteristic behavior' or 'He now
has a tendency to behave in characteristic behavior' or 'He is undergoing characteristic physiological processes'.

The choice of reduction

will vary depending on the school of psychology making the analysis.
In any case, however, analyzing 'characteristic' is problematic
because criteria for emotional states overlap and are not uniform.

For

example, one may fidget nervously and have hot flashes, not only when
one is angry, but also when one wears woolen underclothes.

Furthermore,

anger may bring about pacing and feverishness in one person, but immobility and cold shivers in another.
Austin illuminated one of the difficulties in a behavioristic
definition of psychological states by using the example of 'anger'.

In

his "Pretending" he concluded:
I think it must on reflection be agreed that in whichever of the
ways a man behaves it is open to us to say either 'He is angry'
or 'He is only pretending to be angry', and that either statement
can be in fact true, depending on the (other) circumstances of
the case at least in addition to these features • • • 1
If emotion is a feeling identifiable with physiological sensations, a subject could undergo an emotion only while he was undergoing
sensations.

For example, if John enjoys his chess game, we assume he

is enjoying the entire game, not just those parts during which he is
experiencing jolts of pleasure.

Ryle saw that this claim entails an

1J. L. Austin, "Pretending," in Essays in Philoso hical Ps cholo
ed. Donald F. Gustafson (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1964, p. 101.

9

infinite regress because we could ask of each pleasure sensation, "Was
it pleasant?"

He pointed out that to answer that it was pleasant would

lead to a redundancy or worse: the same question could in turn be asked
about this feeling, and so on ad infinitum.

1

Moreover, if an emotion is a set of sensations then the strength
of an emotion would be the same as the strength of the sensations involved.

'Ihe most extreme emotions would be composed of violent sensa-·

tions which could distradt us to the point of interfering with our activities.

On the contrary, extreme emotions frequently increase the

efficiency of the subject in his activities.

Would a pianist's great

pleasure in playing his favorite concerto, for example, ever interfere
with his playing as a toothache might?

Bedford maintained that emotion

words such as 'anger' are not the names of sets of sensations.

He in-

sisted, for example, that angry men feel no specific anger feelings as
such, nor do we need to experience any feelings at all in order to be
angry.

2

'Ihese examples illustrate that behavioral descriptions and physiological descriptions of psychological states are amenable to linguistic analysis.
1Gilbert Ryle, "Pleasure," in Essa sin Philosophical Psycholo y,
ed. Donald F. Gustafson (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1964, p. 19.
2

Errol Bedford, "Emotions," in Essays in Philoso hical
ed. Donald F. Gustafson (New York: Doubleday & Co., 19 4,

10
Hwnanities
(a) One of the characteristics which uniquely distinguishes the
humanities :from science is language use.

The language of science is de-

notative; that is, free of any dependence on figura.tive language.

In

scientific assertion, synonymous substitution does not affect meaning.
This is not the case in poetry, for example.

Merely substituting syno-

nyms for words in a poem will not reproduce the original meaning of the
poem.
(b) Unlike science, the humanities provide a direct vehicle :for
self-expression; that is, the idiom of the humanities allows the assertion of one's personality in the medium of his production.
(c) Metaphor is the omnipresent principle of the humanities.
Without the metaphoric use of language, it would be impossible for man
to express the ideas that matter most to him.
Religion
Antony Flew and others have argued that religious assertions
8Uch as 'God exists' and 'There is life after death' are meaningless
because such statements are unverifiable.

According to this criticism,

the meaning of a statement consists in the ways in which the statement
is verified,

For example, the meaning of 'This table is five feet long'

can be found in the operations used in determining whether the statement is true or false,
Flew challenged anyone to describe the test conditions by which

11

religious statements could be verified (confirmed) or falsified (disconfirmed) •

1

In answer to Flew's challenge, it can be shown that some religious statements are verifiable, that is, descriptions of test conditions can be generated which would confirm or falsify some religious
.

asser t ions.

2

Consider the statement "''

(name)

is God'.

A substitution in-

stance might be 'Jones is God', or 'Aton is God', or 'Jesus is God'.
What test conditions would confirm or disconfirm the assertion 'Jones
is God'?

An example verification-reduction set could be:

a. J. performs benevolent acts.
b. J. does not perform malevolent acts.
c. J. asserts that he is God.
d. J. performs amazing feats such as waking up corpses, feeding
multitudes of hungry people with a small quantity of food,
curing blindness, walking on water, and so on.
e. J. performs his amazing feats without the mediation of illusions, deceptions, drugs, relief of psychosomatic illness,
floatation devices, hypnosis, hysteria, and so on.
1

An tony Flew, "'Iheology and Falsification, " in 'Ihe Existence of God,
ed. John Hick (New York: Macmillan Co., 1964), pp. 225-227.

2Although John Hick was able to establish a set of testable reduction sentences for ''Ihere is life after death', his results were restricted in that his proposed reduction set was only confirmable but not falsifiable. He argued ad hoc, however, that a statement can be verifiable
without being falsifiable, for example, ''!here are three successive 7's
in the decimal expansion oflf'. John Hick, "'Iheology and Verification,"
'Ihe Existence of God, pp. 253-273.

12
'!he point of this rebuttal to Flew is that theological-religious
statements per se cannot be ruled out of court ab initio on the grounds
that they are unverifiable.

Even if we accept the strict verification-

ist criterion of meaning, Flew's criticism is simply in error.
Without restriction, however, the empiricist criterion of meaning cannot be taken seriously but must be qualified as follows:
1. 'Ihe meaning of an empirical statement about theoretical entities is equivalent to the meaning of its corresponding "testable" (in the Carnapian sense) reduction sentences,
2. A statement has denotative meaning only if it can be reduced
to observational predicates, but its original meaning may not
be equivalent to that of the reduction.
It should be noted that the above restrictions constitute a proposed
reformation of the use of language,

'Iherefore, these restrictions are

as unverifiable as the original empiricist criterion of meaning.

('Ihe

previous statement is a remark about the philosophical grammar of meaning criteria, )
'!he first restriction alludes to a recent revision in the empiricist criterion of meaning as formulated by Carnap.

Accordingly, dispo-

sition terms such as 'soluble' can be defined by stating the test conditions (and positive test results) for which a space-time point could be
described as exhibiting that property, for example, 'if x is placed in
water then, xis soluble if and only if x dissolves'.

Such reductions

have been aptly called "test-conditions-test-results conditionals. 111
1Rudolf Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, eds. Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1953), pp. 52-55.

13
'!he first restriction is a more acceptable formulation of the
verifiability principle because terms which name theoretical entities
are, in fact, shorthand expressions for test-conditions-test-results
conditionals.

'!his formulation of the empiricist criterion of meaning

represents a tautology.

In this form, the empiricist criterion of mean-

ing is not empirically verifiable and, therefore, meaningless in the
strict positivist sense.

From a formalist point of view, however, the

formulation can be regarded as a metalinguistic transformative rule:
having a meaning equivalent to its use.
'!he second restriction establishes the condition that since
language is lea:r:ned through public-social experiences, a (literal)
statement has meaning only if it has public criteria for use.

'!his

study seeks to apply this restriction, however, only to denotative uses
of language and not to metaphoric uses.
'!he second restriction avoids a methodological difficulty with
the empiricist criterion of meaning because it merely states a necessary
,..condition for denotative meaning, but does not make the reduction set
equivalent to the intended meaning of the original statement.
ample, if one were to assert 'Grand.ma is in the sitting room, '

For exthe

assertion could reduce to:
t :
1

If the lady· in the sitting room were fingerprinted, her prints
would be the same as Granny's.

t :
2

If the lady in the sitting room were asked for identification,
she could produce a driver's license with Granny's name on it.

In ordinary language circumstances, we find such reductions

counter-intuitive.

The speaker might protestt for example, "That's not

at all what I meant!
driver's license.

I was not even thinking about :fingerprints or a

Granny doesn't drive.

I wouldn't think of finger-

printing her because she has arthritis in her fingers.

::he would be

deeply offended by such outrageous conduct."
Regardless of how comprehensive and cautious we are in generating
empirical verification sets for an assertion, one could always ?bject,
"That is not at all what I intended by my statement."

By this analysis,

we can only accept an empirical reduction set as a necessary condition
for meaning, not as the meaning of the original statement.

It is not be-

ing argued here that such reduction sets are useless, however.

Test-

condi tion-test-resul t conditionals are useful to the empiricist in formulating operational definitions so that hypotheses may be advanced and
tested.
Now, pressing the Jones analysis further, we might hypothesize
~•that,

indeed there are historical accounts of a Jones who realized test

conditions (a) through (e) several hundred years ago,

Now, 'Jones is

God ' resembles 'Lincoln was shot.' because further verification entails
an additional criterion:
f. The written historical accounts about J, are true, accurate,
and comprehensive,
Regardless of the evidence in favor of (f), however, some degree
of uncertainty may remain.

Believing that Lincoln was shot, for example,

15
requires faith in historical records such as the news reports of the
period, and faith in the veracity and accuracy of eye witnesses, and so
on.

'!he positivists have recognized that empirical assertions are never

completely verified, although they may be completely confirmable or completely testable.

1

'!he parallel of the Jones case to Christianity is, of course,
not a matter of coincidence.

Long ago, Isaias developed the following

confirmation criteria for 'J. is God ':
God himself will come and will save you, Then shall the eyes of
the blind be opened, and the ears of the deaf be unstopped, '!hen
shall the lame man leap and the tongue of the dumb be free.2
An observer later reported that these test conditions were realized,

that is, each test predicate was not only observable, but observed:
Go and report to John what you have heard and seen: the blind see,
the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead
rise, , , .3
Therefore, skepticism related to the assertion 'Jesus is God.'
involves either empirical doubts about criteria (e) and (f), or doubts
~

about the reduction set being a sufficient confirmation basis for 'J.
is God '•
The second kind of skepticism involves the issue of conventionalism, that is, it is a matter of convention how we stipulate an opera1Rudolf Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, eds. Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1953), pp. 84-86.
2

Isaias 35:4-6.

3Matthew 11:3-6.
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tional definition of an empirical predicate.

For example, it is merely

a matter of convention that we operationalize 'measuring this table top'
as 'laying off a foot ruler x number of times along the length and width '
We could have specified metric measurement, or the use of surveyor's instruments, or even 'doing a rhumba across the table top', if we chose.
Paradoxically, operational definitions are thus mixtures of conventionalbut-yet-not-arbitrary meaning criteria.
The first mentioned skepticism rests on empirical grounds, not
on logical or linguistic grounds.

Christians, of course, set aside their

empirical doubts, much as contemporaries generally set aside doubts that
Lincoln was shot.
It should be noted, that the rebuttal of Flew's criticism does
not establish that:
1. All religious/theological statements are true.
2. No religious/theological assertion is self-contradictory.

3. All religious/theological statements are meaningful.
4. Established confirmation bases for empirically verifiable
religious/theological assertions are acceptable to all persons.
The rebuttal entails establishing only that some religious/theological
claims are verifiable (meaningful in the logical positivist sense).
'Ihe logical positivists and ordinary language analysts have been
generally antireligious but not without a notable exception.

In his

Notebooks Wittgenstein remarked,
To believe in a God means to understand the question about
the meaning of life. To believe in a God means to see that the
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facts of the world are not the end of the matter.
God means to see that life has a meaning,1

To believe in a

A fragment from his Zettel reveals a linguistic basis for Wittgenstein's
understanding of God: "'You can't hear God speak to someone else, you
can hear Him only if you are being addressed,'--'Ihat is a grammatical
remark •

,.2

Metaphysics and 'Iheology
Wittgenstein recognized that public accessibility is a necessary
condition for learning (using) language.

For Wi ttgenstej_n, part of the

meaning of a statement is found in the speech act and within the form of
life in which the utterance is made.

For example, the meaning of 'Halt!'

is embedded in the act of a sentry stopping an unauthorized intruder into
a military compound,
life,

'Ihe meaning partly arises in the military form of

Part of our understanding of 'Halt!', therefore, involves under-

standing the use of the expression by a guard, the rationale for obeying the order, the consequences of not obeying, and a host of other things,
In short, we must understand the military 'language game" which Wittgen~

stein would describe as the philosophical grammar of 'Halt' •
To understand the meaning of the word 'book' we must, therefore,
not only understand the "naming language game" (the process of ostensi ve
definition), but at least some of the companion public actions such as
reading a book, bringing a book, turning the pages of a book, and so on.
11udwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks, eds. G. H. van Wright and G. E. M.
Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), p. 74e.
2Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel (1928-1948), eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and
G. H. van Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 21e.
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In short, we must have assimilated at least some of the public forms of
life associated with book utilization.
In spite of the supposed opposition between the Tractatus (logical positivism) and the Investigations (ordinary language analysis),
there is an obvious ingredient common to both: a public accessibility
criterion for denotative language use.

'Ihe "simples" of the Tractatus

were to be publicly observable and the criteria of the Investigations
were to be public criteria. In view of this strong public accessibility
doctrine, one would expect that Wittgenstein was forced to reject metaphysics and theology (as most positivists and ordinary language analysts
have done).
We arrive now at a revelation of a different Wittgenstein, not
the antimetaphysical critic, but the champion and protector of theology
and metaphysics.
It may be the case that some theological assertions are verifiable, but others are clearly not, for example, 'God is perfect '.
statements have an obvious metaphysical character.

Such

Are such statements,

therefore, meaningless?
'.fhe difficulty with metaphysical statements arises from a limitation of language itself, and since language is the vehicle of thought,
our very thoughts suffer this same limitation.
Wittgenstein has been interpreted, until recently, as arguing
that language misleads philosophers and theologians into making meaning-
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less metaphysical statements.
S. Morris Engel, however, has suggested a new view of Wittgenstein as revealed in what Engel calls "the dilemma of the Blue Book."
Engel observes that it is one thing to claim that it is possible that
philosophers are misled by language, but it is still another matter to
claim that linguistic confusion must arise inevitably.

Here Engel is al-

luding to the superficial appearance of a contradiction in the Blue Book. 1
At times, Wittgenstein's dominant thesis seems to be that the
source of philosophic confusion is language: language is the source of
our philosophical perplexities and, therefore, language is the level at
which the problems must be solved.

At other times, Wittgenstein seems

to hint at an entirely different thesis: " • • • we try to find a form of
expression which fulfills a certain craving of the metaphysician which
our ordinary language does not fulfill • • • and which produces • • •
puzzlement." 2
Engel believes that in such passages, Wittgenstein is suggesting
that not all metaphysical perplexities are products of linguistic confusion, but arise instead from a curious discontentment that the metaphysician has with language itself.3 In a similar passage Wittgenstein
declares: "Our ordinary language holds our mind.rigidly in one position,
1 s. Morris Engel, Witt enstein's Doctrine of the T
An Historical and Critical Examination of His Blue Book
Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 14-17.
2Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (New York: Harper &
Bros., 19.58), p. 55.
3Thgel, Tyranny of Language, pp. 14-17.
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as it were, and in this position sometimes it feels cramped, having_ a
desire for other positions as well. 111
trine of "the tyranny of language."

Here we find Wittgenstein's doc-

Now he speaks not of a problem with

the philosopher, but rather of a problem with language itself: language
is confining and the metaphysician is forced to revise it.
In summary, the dilemma of the Blue Book is that two differing

theses seem to have been advanced by Wittgenstein:
1. that language deceives the metaphysician into absurd doctrine
2. that the metaphysician realizes that existing language is unable to express "certain things" and, therefore, he is forced
to invent new usages to try to express them.
If the second thesis is correct in asserting that the metaphysician is forced to revise language because of its constricting nature,
then it does no good to show him how these expressions are actually used
in ordinary language, since that is precisely what gives him discomfort.
'Ihis second thesis implies that philosophical confusion sometimes runs
deeper than language even though its symptoms are exhibited linguistically.2
We know that Wittgenstein did not hold metaphysicians in contempt.
Wittgenstein was, after all, a metaphysician himself.

Once he remaiked

to Drury: "Don't think that I despise metaphysics or ridicule it.

On the

contrary, I regard the great metaphysical writings of the past as among
1
Wittgenstein, Blue Book, p.
2

59.

Ehgel, Tyranny of Language, pp. 14-17.
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the noblest productions of the human mind. 111
Wittgenstein's greatest accomplishment was to have recognized
that because leaining language requires public criteria, its denotative
use cannot describe those things which transcend the publicly observable.
Language can describe that which is transcendent only figuratively.
By this view all metaphysical assertions are metaphoric statements and cannot be interpreted literally.

Wittgenstein thus reserved

the metaphoric use of language not only for the humanities, but for metaphysics and theology as well.
To summarize, Wittgenstein discovered that the relationship between language and reality, between God and man, cannot be stated literally but can only be hinted at indirectly in metaphoric language.

Only

metaphoric language can describe the transcendent.
At this juncture, Christians would hasten to point out that much
of what Christ said was spoken in parables.

Was this style chosen because

Christ spoke to simpletons who could only understand fables?
enigmatic allegories are hardly food for the simpleton.

Obscure,

An alteinative

explanation is that Christ had no choice except to speak in the only idiom
available to designate the transcendent world.
Wittgenstein's contribution was to reveal a division of labor in
language which appropriates the denotative use of language to science;
and the metaphoric use to metaphysics, theology, religion and the arts.
1
Ibid., p. 37.
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Whenever a person uses denotative language when he should be
using metaphoric language, he is doomed to utter nonsense.
doctrine of the tyranny of language.

'Ihat is the

Language legislates a different

use depending on whether the referents to be designated are publicly
accessible or transcendent.

'Ihe tyrant's decree is "Wovon man nicht

sprechen kann, darii'ber muss man schweigen. 111
Under this interpretation, assertions in metaphysics and theology can be regarded as paraverifiable but yet not meaningless.

Instead

of linguistic philosophy being the roadblock to metaphysics, it can be
its triumphal arch back into philosophy and education.
A New Definition of 'Man'
Even the definition of 'man' can be stipulated in terms of language characteristics.

Mead, the American pragmatist, was the first to

suggest this new definition.

Although Mead recognized that many biolog-

ical species use language (signs), he realized: only man understands his
own utterances.
For Mead, the self, mind, and consciousness of man arise simultaneously through the process of linguistic social experience.

'Ihe self,

mind, and consciousness are not present at birth (except potentially),
but develop out of the process of language acquisition.

'!he self begins

1Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F.
Pears and B. F. McGuinness, with an Introduction by Bertrand Russell
(New York: The Humanities Press, 1961), p. 150. The famous seventh proposition traditionally thought to be a censure of metaphysics can be reinterpreted as a pronouncement to science (and metaphysics).
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to develop when the human organism acquires the use of social gestures
which have become "significant symbols,"

Man becomes a self as soon as

he is able to interpret and anticipate the meaning of his own gestures.
For Mead, "the internalized conversation of gestures constitutes think.

1ng.

,,1

Mead does not limit communication to vocal gestures, however,
"There is the language of speech and the language of hands and the language of the expression of the countenance. 112
Although many species have achieved communication of gestures,
only man has taken an additional leap up the evolutionary ladder.
man can understand his own gestural utterances,

Only

According to Mead, a

dog snarls and other dogs "understand" this snarling, but the snarling
dog does not understand his own snarl.

The growling dog is thus emit-

ing a vocal gesture' (symbol), but is not being controlled or affected
by it. 3
The self emerges only when the emitted gestures become understood by the organism emitting them, that is, when what we are going to
do is controlling what we are doing. 4 For example, to yell "Fire!" in a
crowded theater upon smelling smoke is merely an automatic response, not
a significant symbol, unless the vocal gesture "Fire!" affects the speaker as it affects others.
1

"Fire!" becomes a significant symbol when the

George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, ed. and with an Introduction by Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962),
p. 1_56.
2
4rbid., p. xxi.
3Ibid,, p. xx.
Ibid,, p, 147.
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urge to emit this symbol is controlled by the speaker because of his understanding of the meaning of the symbol.

"The effect on himself of

what he is about to say checks him; there is here a conversation of gestures between the individual and himself. 111
During this inner conversation of symbols, "the individual experiences himself • • • from the generalized standpoint of the social
group as a whole to which he belongs. 112

Here Mead is focusing on what

is necessary to the existence of the self:
The organized community or social group which gives to the
individual his unity of self may be called "the generalized other."
• • • only by taking the attitude of the generalized other toward
himself, ••• can he think at all; for only thus can thinking-the inte:rnalized conversation of gestures--occur.3
Mead believed that only man has made this transition from impulse to rationality.

His explanation for man's uniqueness is that only

the human organism has the neurological makeup necessary to undergo this
qualitative change: ". • • the self reaches its full development through
the mechanism of the central nervous system, , • , 114
Mead's analysis of social language as the very substance of
thought is brought to mind when we review the experiences of Helen Keller.
At the age of seven, Helen became aware of significant symbols and of the
"naming language game" (that signs can designa:te objects).

The force of

these discoveries changed her from a "dumb" animal to a thinking, human
self.

Helen described her experiences as follows:

1Ibid., p. 141.

4Ibid., p, 1_58.

2Ibid

I

,

p. 1.38.

3Ibid., pp. 154-1_56.
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As the cool water gushed over one hand she spelled into the
other the word "water" first slowly, then rapidly. I stood still,
my whole attention fixed upon the motion of her fingers.
Suddenly I felt a misty consciousness • • • and somehow the
mystery of language was revealed to me. I knew then that "w-a-t-e-r"
meant the wonderful, cool something that was flowing over my hand.
That living word awakened my soul, gave it light, hope, joy, set it
free,
• I left the wellhouse eager to learn. Everything had a
name, and each name gave birth to a new thought.1
The words of Helen Keller thus stand as a testimony revealing the relationship between language, thought, and the self.
From Mead's point of view regarding the distinction between man
and other animal species, the "talking apes" do not have a self and thus
are qualitatively different from man.

The chimpanzee, "Washoe," for

example, may have been conditioned to automatically use signs denotatively, but there is no evidence that Washoe's behavior is controlled
by her own "utterances."

Her signs do not appear to be "significant."

According to this view, the talking apes do not have internalized, egocentric speech.
The transformational grammarian, McNeil, also doubts that Washoe
has acquired genuine human language because of syntactical "peculiarities" exhibited by the chimpanzee: "I find much room for doubt that the
chimpanzee has learned to use genuine words. 112

He notes that all at-

tempts to teach primates to "speak" have "failed dismally. ,,J
1Helen Keller, The Story of My Life (New Yo:rk: Dell Publishing Co.,
1961), p. 34.
2David McNeil, The Ac uisition of Lan ua e: The Stud of Develo mental Psycholinguistics New York: Harper & Row, 1970 , p. 54.
3rbid.

r
!
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Although Piaget and others have suggested that thought does not
require language, the Russian linguists, most notably Vygotsky and Luria,
. . t•ion. 1
insis t th a t th ought d epend s on 1 anguage acqu1s1

Wittgenstein, who has the unique distinction of giving impetus
to two contemporary philosophical systems, logical positivism and ordinary
language analysis, also contended that in order to think, the thinking
subject must have language.
Until recently, the interpretations.of Wittgenstein relied almost
exclusively upon the Tractatus and the Investigations.

Within the last

decade, however, Wittgenstein's other works, more recently published,
have become regarded as most important because they reveal a bridge across
Wittgenstein's seemingly opposing views as represented by logical positivism (the Tractatus) and ordinary language analysis (the Investigations).
In his Blue Book and Zettel, for example, Wittgenstein analyzed

the relationship among mind, language, meaning, and thought.

His analy-

sis is noticeably different from the theme of the Tractatus or of the
Investigations.

Some of his main arguments may be summarized as follows:

1. Philosophers are misled into believing that there are occult
processes such as thinking, hoping, and wishing which are independent of the processes of expressing thoughts, hopes, and
wishes: "Testimony • • • cannot convince one that it is possible to think without a language. 112
1Ibid. , p. 126.
2Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel (1928-1948), eds. G.• E. M. Anscombe and
G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Berkeley: University of Califoxnia Press, 1967), p. 21e.
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2. The mind is not an agent in the same way that the hand is an
agent in writing.

This way of speaking is only a metaphor.

To say otherwise, is to be misled by our mistaken belief that
all nouns must have referents in the denotative sense: "One of
the most dangerous ideas • • • is that we think with our heads
or in our heads. 111

3. What is the real meaning of a word? Whatever meaning we give
to it, and some words literally have thousands of meanings
(uses).
Clearly, Wittgenstein's position is that thinking requires language and
that thoughts are not mental images in one's head.
The Reunification of Curriculum
If it is difficult to classify the various educational disciplines, it is so because the process of classifying and compartmentalizing education is itself artificial.
the realm of biology or the humanities?

Is the definition of 'man' within
Is religion a part of history or

theology (or perhaps metaphysics, philosophy, logic, or psychology)?

'Ihe

barriers among disciplines were erected long ago, most formally by Aristotle.

Although many modeni. educators have sensed the error of separa-

tism in curriculum, it has been difficult to philosophically justify reunification.
It is clear that there are pragmatic advantages to specialization
or depth knowledge in a specific discipline.

Also, the overpowering ad-

vent of the "knowledge explosion" requires that we organize and select
1
Ibid., p. 105e.
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our reception of information.

At the same time, however, many concerns

are beginning to emerge related to man's imbalanced diet of knowledge.
We have become more aware of the interrelatedness of our problems,
especially in politics, ecology, ethics, economics, and technology.

'!he

new perspective in medicine of "wholistic heal th care" gives testimony to
the value of integrating the various disciplines in the solution of our
problems.
We are now faced with the most awesome problems that have ever
confronted mankind.

'Ihese new problems are cataclysmic in their conse-

quences because for the first time in history their outcome will determine whether man will vanish from "spaceship earth" in a final nuclear
or ecological convulsion.
As Plato saw the need for philosophical vision in government,
we must apprehend the value of philosophical vision in education.

'lllis

new, unitary perspective must be inculcated in students, teachers, and
administrators.

Only then will education produce the most appropriate

framework for tomorrow's solutions.
Is there a strand of unity that runs through the multidisciplinary, educational fabric?

The thesis herein advanced is that phil-

osophy, and especially linguistic philosophy, is that reunifying thread.
Once we have made the linguistic turn in philosophy and in education, we
will be able to see that all things are related through language, and
that curriculum can be reconstructed on a new metalinguistic foundation.
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This work is attempting to illuminate a reinterpretation of philosophy and education, which makes language the central axis.

Language

would thus gain a metaphysical significance in philosophy and in education: that language is the very essence of man, of man's relationship to
his God, of science, and of the arts.
The Function of Philosophy in Etlucation
The question concerning the role of philosophy in education can
now be answered.
First, reconstructed philosophy and especially linguistic philosophy must become an important part of the curriculum at every level so
that the learner will discover a unity in his diverse world.

This uni-

versal perspective must become a principal aim of education.
Even if this idealistic goal were not reached, there is new evidence that the teaching of philosophy, in itself, may be instrumental in
yielding advances in basic academic skills.

For example, in 197.5 the

Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (Montclair State
College) completed experimental research which demonstrates that elementary age school children who are taught philosophy make significant gains
in reading and in critical thinking skills, as well as highly significant
gains with respect to interpersonal relationships. 1
111Resul ts of 197.5 Experimental Research in Philosophy for Children,"
(Mimeographed). See also Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp, and
Frederick S. Oscanyan, Pnilosophy in the Classroom (West Caldwell, N. J.:
Universal Diversified Services, 1977).
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'Ihe improvement of the experimental group in language was most
dramatic.

'Ihe children in the experimental classes gained an average of

eight months over the control group.

One class gained a year and four

months, and another advanced two and a half years. 1
Secondly, the curriculum should be reconstructed intradisciplinarily and interdisciplinarily.

Within each subject linguistic aspects

should be made explicit, and the various disciplines should be reorganized according to metalinguistic relationships.
'Ihirdly, the value and meaning of theology, religion, metaphysics, and the humanities should be reassessed (as well as parascientific
phenomena such as intuition, religious experience, and psychic experience).
Finally, educational problems should be approached from a linguistic standpoint including the application of ordinary language analysis, verificationism, and the linguistic turn.
Now that the new role of linguistic philosophy in education has
been proposed, what must follow is a demonstration of a paradigm application of this new role.

CHAPTER II

THE THEORY OF LEARNING DISABILITY:
A PRE-SCIENCE

Bertrand Russell once described philosophy as "speculation about
matters where scientific knowledge is not yet possible. "

1

According to

Russell's view, one of the services of philosophy is to formulate problems so that they can be handed over to science in a science-acceptable
form.

The formulation process serves to clarify the problem so that it

becomes more amenable to the scientific method.
There are many problems in foundations of education that are in
need of clarification.
"How does one learn?"

One such problem is represented by the question:
Recently, many advances are beginning to appear

in the areas of behaviorism, neurophysiology, psycholinguistics, .and la.nguage acquisition theory which promise to shed considerable light on the
problem.
The behaviorists, however, have implicitly reformulated the
question as "What are the extemal, publicly accessible aspects of learning?" and the neurologists have revised the question to "What cen tra.l
1Bertrand Russell, Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind, comp. The Hearst
Corporation (New York: Hearst Corporation, 1960), p, 9.
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nervous system activities and structures are necessary conditions for
learning?"
One of the functions of philosophy is to make such implicit reformulations explicit so that it becomes clear which derivative question
is really being addressed by science and how this reformulation differs
from the original question.

For example, to what extent does the answer

to the question "What central nervous system activities and structures
are necessary conditions for learning?" answer the question ''How does
one leam?"
A companion question to ''How does one learn?" is "What prevents
one from learning?" and this second question has received much more attention than its consort for at least two reasons.
First, in the United States educators find themselves confronted
by the challenge of "universal education."

American education has been

based on an assumption that all children can learn and that education is
for everyone.

In America, education is valued because it is regarded as

an instrument for the maintenance of democracy.

As a result of adopting

mass education we are frequently faced with students who have difficulty
learning.
Second, there has recently developed a legal movement in the
United States to "mainstream" "exceptional" children.

Here 'exceptional'

means educationally handicapped and 'mainstream' means educate within
the normal peer group environment.

This movement has been brought about
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by legislation on behalf of exceptional children and by litigation surrounding special education.
In 1975 the Etlucation of All Handicapped Children Act, as signed
by President Ford, became the law of the land.

This law requires equal

educational opportunities for all exceptional children regardless of the
severity of their leaniing handicaps.

Under this law, all educationally

handicapped children must be provided a free, public education in the
least restrictive environment; that is, they are to be educated with
their normal peer group as much as possible.

1

'Ihe famous Bro'Wn Case of 1954 established the precedent that
"separate is not equal" not only as related to race but to every social
category.

The courts now interpret the "separate is not equal" doctrine

as applying to educationally handicapped children.

2

Until the last decade, exceptional children were most often
placed in "special education" institutions or in "special" classrooms.
In the Mill Case of 1972, a class action suit was brought against a
school board on behalf of all handicapped children.
in favor of exceptional children.

'Ihe case was won

The court decreed that children

forced into special education placements were being deprived of their
civil rights.

F.ach year additional litigation is being won on behalf

of exceptional children and being lost by those who espouse a separatist
philosophy of special education.3
1Thomas N. Fairchild and Ferris O. Henson, Mainstreaming Exceptional
Children (Austin, Texas: Leaniing Concepts Inc, , 1976) , p. 57,
-------.......
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Ibid., p. _58,
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Now that the problem of educating handicapped children has become the responsibility of local boards of education, the question
"What prevents one from learning?" has taken on a new urgency.

'Ihe

answer to this question will indirectly provide an answer to its companion question "How does one learn?"

Hence, there is a double motive

for exploring this problem.
Etlucational handicaps are considered to be of six different
types:
1. behavioral disorders such as schizophrenia
2. physical handicaps such as visual impairments, deafness, and
muscular dystrophy

3. profound brain damage
4. mental retardation (operationally defined as IQ below 80)
5. environmental, cultural, and economic disadvantage
6. learning disability; that is, leaming problems not listed
above

An analysis of the last category, "leaming disability," will
have paradigmatic value because many of the problems surrounding the
concept of learning disability are shared by the other labels.
The problem of "What is a learning disability?" is especially
amenable to philosophical investigation because of the newness of the
field of learning disability (1960-65).

The study of learning disabil-

ity is in a prescientific stage of development, characteristically laden
with confused definition, competing models, and inconsistent practices.
As recently as February 1976, for example, researchers have shown
that the most frequently used tests to identify learning disabled chil-
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dren are, in fact, unable to differentiate between

normal

and learning

disabled children. 1
The tasks at hand in this field are clarification, definition,
hypothesis formulation, validation of premises, and the postulation of a
productive ontology--all philosophical activities.

The next chapters of

this work are devoted to accomplishing these tasks.
1 ste:phen C. Larsen, Dorothy Rogers, and Virginia Sowell, "The Use of
Selected Perceptual Tests in Differentiating between Normal and Learning
Disabled Children," Journal of Learning Disabilities 9 (February 1976):85.

CHAPTER III
A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF THE DEFINITIONS
AND MODELS OF LEARNING DISABILITY

Introduction
In this chapter the de jure definition of 'lea:ming disability'
will be criticized along with the de facto definition commonly used by
practitioners in the field of special education.

Finally, three com-

peting models of explanation for learning disability will be examined
and will be evaluated on the basis of their efficacy in remediating the
problem of learning disability.
The De Jure Definition
In the Eiucation for All Handicapped Children Act, Congress de-

fined 'children with learning disability' as follows:
Those children who have a disorder in one or more of the basic
psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do
mathematical calculations. Such disorders include such conditions
as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction,
dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. Such term does not include
children who have lea:ming problems which are primarily the result
of visual, hearing, or motor handicaps, of mental retardation, of
emotional disturbance, or environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage.1
1Federal Register 41 (November 29, 1976):52404.
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As it stands, the federal definition is a tangle of conceptual
confusion arising from defects in its extensionality, consistency, and
operational translatability.
Extensional problems exist in the definition because its language creates uncertainty as to whether a given child is a member of
the set of children designated by the definition.

For example, "imper-

feet ability" is a description which admits every member of the human
race into the extension of the definition.
component descriptors defy exact definition.

Furthermore, many of the
For example, there are

now over twenty different definitions of the term 'dyslexia', thirtyeight different terms used synonymously with 'learning disability',
and over one hundred symptoms attributed to children given the label
"learning disabled. 111
Consistency problems exist in the definition because some parts
of the definition qualify certain subjects as learning disabled while
other parts of the definition disqualify these same subjects.

For ex-

ample, the definition includes "perceptual handicaps" at the same time
~

as it excludes "visual" and "hearing" handicaps.

.Also, when the defi-

nition includes perceptual handicaps but excludes mental retardation,
the implication is that mentally retarded children could not have perceptual problems (learning disabilities) in addition to their "IQ problem."
1Terry West and Carol Millsom, ''Learning Disabilities Funding," Eliucational Leadershi Journal of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development 32 May 1975 :507.
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The federal definition, at one moment includes children 'Who have
brain injury but at the next moment it excludes children with learning
problems "primarily the result of • • • environmental or economic disadvantage."

This implies that the two sets of children, thus designated,

are disjoint.

What is the status of a child who was brain damaged as a

result of environmental factors or economic factors?

Does the child

qualify for the services of the learning disability program?

How is

the educator to determine whether a child's brain injury resulted from
environmental or economic circumstances?
Operational problems exist in the definition because parts of
the definition imply that the educator is to identify learning disabled
children by etiological classification, for example, "brain injury • • •
minimal brain dysfunction," and "not • • • the result of • • • environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage." Definitions couched in
terms of causes rather than publicly observable effects are difficult
to operationalize.
Definition 'Which prescribes identification through etiology rather than through syndrome is most appropriate for two audiences:
1. specialists who are searching for causation in order to remove
or prevent those causes
2. specialists who have a treatment available for the identified
cause of a malady
From the point of view of the educator, however, neither one of
these circumstances prevails.

Unfortunately, there is no etiological
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"cure" for learning disability at the disposal of the educator.

Further,

the function of the educator is not to search for etiology since he does
not have the scientific expertise for such a venture.
Furthermore, an etiological definition does not generate an educational prescription for remediation.

For example, a child being "min-

imaJ..ly brain damaged" operationalizes to a dysrhythmic EEG.

Apart from

the impracticalities involved in obtaining EEC's, verification of actual
brain damage must wait until an autopsy reveals a cortical lesion.

What

should the educator do with the so-called "brain damaged child" until the
postmortem?

The entire mystique of the EEC in education can be discarded

on the grounds that the EEC is educationally fruitless in relation to
remediation.
Taking the view of the behaviorist would give clearer direction
for remediation of learning disability because this view overcomes some
of the operational difficulties by focusing on effect rather than cause.
For example, knowing that a child has a specific problem with morphology
is more useful to the educator in terms of educational prescription than
knowing that the child exhibits evidence of "organici ty. 11
The illogic of adopting the medical model of etiology in the
field of learning disability consists in the fact that there is no known
medical therapy for specific learning disability.

Further, there is

growing evidence that no neurophysiological disorder corresponds to this
diagnosis.

Until further medical research confirms a neurophysiological

basis for leaming disability, minimal brain dysfunction may be

~egarded

r
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I

I

by educators as a fiction.

I

'!he many defects in the federal definition of lea:rning disability

I

are becoming more evident as practitioners struggle to interpret it.

The

Bureau for the Etlucation of the Handicapped (BEH) now admits that "the
state of the art in the field of lea:rning disability • • • is such that
it is not presently possible to specify exactly" what a lea:rning disability is. 1
What are the consequences of confused definition?

First, with-

out clear definition, accurate identification is almost impossible.

For

example, the incidence of learning disability can range from one percent
to as high as twenty percent, depending only on how the educator decides
to define the tem. 2

Therefore, the educator can never be reasonably

certain which children are learning disabled, that is, which children
need specialized assistance.
Secondly, confused definition leads to confused diagnosis and
prescription.

As a result, the educator is hampered in the development

of intervention strategies and materials.
Finally, because of the enormous confusion that now exists in
the profession conce:rning the meaning of 'learning disability',

1Federal Register 41 (November 29, 1976):52404.
2

Eleanor T. Kenney, "Learning Disability: What It Is and Is Not,"
Educational Leadershi Jou:rnal of the Association for Su ervision and
Curriculum Development 32 May 1975 : 507.

41
In virtually eve-:ry kind of setting • • • the LD teachers report
that they and their colleagues are frequently plagued with con-,
siderable doubts about the meaning, or even the validity of their
professional activities.1
With great uncertainty, the school administrator is thus forced to defend to his clients the legitimacy of a vague, specialized service given
to a nebulous group of children by often insecure and uncertain, specialist teachers.
Clearly, what is needed is a revision in the de jure definition,
The arguments to be presented will attempt to establish the following
revision as a better definition of 'children with learning disability'
(or more accurately, as a better description of children with lea:rning
disability): those children who have a disorder in the process involved
in understanding or in using language.

This proposal will have the ef-

feet of taking 'learning disability' to mean semiotical disorder.

'Ihe

proposed definition is a natural consequence of adopting the linguistic
turn.
The De Facto Definition
Because of the confusion surrounding the de jure definition of
lea:rning disability, educators have been forced to adopt a "common sense"
definition of learning disability.

From the educational practitioner's

point of view, a child has a lea:rning disability if, in spite of his
apparent "ability," the child does not "achieve" well academically,
1cerald M. Senf, Anthony H. Luick, and Beverly P. Sawyer, "State
Initiative in Lea:rning Disabilities: Illinois' Project SCREEN," Jou:rnal
of Lea:rning Disabilities 8 (November 1975):.588.
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At the schoolhouse level, t?e following criterion has been generally ad.opted for identifying learning disability:
a significant discrepancy between a child's actual performance on
standardized achievement tests and his expected performance based
on IQ.
For example, we would expect a child with "normal" ability (IQ
score at an obtained grade level of

5.5

were in the middle of the fifth grade.

= 100)

to

on an achievement test, if he
But let us suppose that his ac-

tual performance is only 1. 5 (in terms of grade equivalent), then the
percent discrepancy between his expected performance (EP) and his actual performance (AP) is:
EP - AP X 100
EP
or

5 · 5 - 1 • 5 x 100
5,5

= %discrepancy

= 73%

'!his criterion has become so popular among practitioners in the
field of learning disability that one of its versions has become absorbed
into HEW's proposed rules and regulations for implementing the Eliucation
for All Handicapped Children Act.

The proposed regulations further stip-

ulate that in order to be considered severe enough to qualify as learning disability, the discrepancy must be greater than or equal to fifty
percent. 1
One of the problems with this kind of de facto, operational definition is that, regardless of the numerical threshold assigned to 'severe discrepancy', that critical assignment is arbitrary.
1
Federal Register 41 (November 29, 1976):52407.
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Another difficulty with the de facto definition of leaming
disability is its inherent dependence on the disputed IQ measure.

If,

for example, IQ critics are correct in their claim that existing ability
tests are merely achievement tests in disguise, then the discrepancy criterion is invalid because the so-called "ability-performance" discrepancy
is not actually a discrepancy between ability (expected achievement based
on IQ) and performance since IQ tests, by this criticism, do not really
measure "ability. "
In order to avoid the problems associated with the de facto definition of leaming disability, most educational practitioners ultimately
rely on "clinical judgment" as an additional, deciding criterion.

Intro-

ducing subjectivity into the identification process, however, creates an
additional difficulty: whether a child is determined to be leal'.Iling disabled will now depend on the idiosyncracies of the evaluating team. 1
Because of the ultimate subjectivity of the referral and identification process, there is a danger that any child showing "unacceptable"
behavior may be labelled "LD."

Leaming disability may thus become a

r\

verbal cloak (resulting, for example, from ego defense) under which lies
the teachers' failures.

Kirk and Elkins have revealed, for example,

that children are commonly misidentified as leaming disabled when, in
fact, they are simply children who are failing in their school work due
1Lloyd M. Dunn, "Special Etlucation for the Mildly Retarded: Is Much
of It Justifiable?," in An Em irical Basis for Chane in Etlucation, ed.
Wesley C. Becker (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1971 , p. 45.
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to causes other than learning disabilities. 1
Competing Models and Their Efficacy in Remediation
Underlying the definitional confusion related to the concept of
learning disability is a proliferation of models of explanation for
learning disability.

The existing explanations for learning disability

can be classified into three general types:
1. central nervous system disorder
2. perceptual handicap

J.

input-output channel disorders
The neurological model explains that, in a learning disabled

child, learning is blocked by a dysfunction of the brain.

Speaking in

the physicalist idiom, the neurological model can be described as follows:
Learning and memory are functions of patterns of neural connections
in the central nervous system.
ly separated.

Neurons (nerve cells) are physical-

Brain activity involves a chemical-electrical activ-

ity among the neurons.

These impulses are transmitted across the

neural gaps by way of liquid hormonal bridges.

These transmissions

can be regarded as "information" much the same as modulated electrical impulses in telephone wires and in computer circuits can be
2
regarded as information.
Research during the last decade indicates that oversimplified
neurological explanations of learning, such as the explanation that lea:rning and memory are encoded onto large molecular structures in the brain,
1 Samuel A. Kirk and John Elkins, "Characteristics of Children Enrolled in the Child Service Demonstration Centers," Journal of Learning
Disabilities 8 (November 1975):630-637.
2rrving S. Bengelsdorf, "The Brain and Nervous System in Learning and
Memory," The Eliucation Digest (December 1975), pp. 19-22.

are unfo1.mded.

There is no empirical evidence for the engram--the Holy

Grail of psychology--corresponding, for example, to neural patterns which
house the multiplication tables in the brain. 1
The most remarkable result of the neurological model is not how
much has been revealed by it, but how very little it has illuminated our
understanding of the concept of learning as a function of neurophysiology.
Bertrand Russell's quip, "If your head is cut off, it immensely diminishes your thinking power;• 2 is representative of the present yield of information from neurophysiology to educational practice.

For example, al-

though it is now suspected that hormones released during emotional states
may influence long-term or short-term memory, it is uncertain whether
this hormonal release enhances or impairs memory.3

Furthermore, applied

research in this area has been mainly conducted on infrahuman subjects,
making the promise of possible classroom application rather remote.
Among the many questions still to be answered are:
1. To what extent is the pattern of neural interconnections

determined by genetics (for example, the "language acquisition
device")?
2. To what extent is this pattern development determined by experience, environment, and nutrition?
3, What information is available from neural research that can be
applied to educational practice?
Until thesP. and related questions have been answered by science, the cen1
Ibid.
2Russell, Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind, p.
3:sengelsdorf, "The Brain and Nervous System,

1
'

155.
p. 22.

r
tral nervous system model will be of little use to educators.

Further,

since the neurological model has not yet yielded any educational prescription for learning disability, its current efficacy in educational
remediation can be regarded as nonexistent.
According to the second, perceptual model as advanced by Frostig,
Weprnan, Maslow, and others, deficits in perceptual abilities, such as
figure-ground differentiation and auditory discrimination, interfere with
learning and, therefore, constitute learning disabilities. 1
Although this view of learning disability has much persuasiveness,
there is no evidence correlating perceptual disability with poor achievement.

In longitudinal studies comparing perceptual assessment scores of

children with diagnosed perceptual disability to their scores on language
arts achievement tests, no significant correlation was found.

In other

words, poor performance on perceptual tasks is not predictive of low academic achievement or of learning disability.

Therefore, at the present

time, it appears that the only diagnostic value of perceptual tests is in
~

the area of acuity rather than in the area of reception. 2
Studies have also been conducted which experimentally test the
effects of perceptual remediation activities on learning disabled chil1

Janet W. Lerner, Theories Di
osis Teachin Strate ies: Children
with Learning Disabilities, 2nd ed, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976 ,
p. 154.
2 Ronald P. Colarusso, Hannah Martin, and Joseph Hartung, "Specific
Visual Perceptual Skills as Long-Term Predictors of Academic Success,"
Journal of Learning Disabilities 8 (December 1975):651-655,

r
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dren.

The results indicate that the development of "perceptual skills"

merely helps a child perform better on subsequent perceptual tests but
not better on academic achievement tests.

1 Unfortunately, this second

model of learning disability also has not yielded an effective prescription for remediation,
'Ihe third model of learning disability is the most widely accepted view.

According to Kirk, Cruickshank, Kephart, and others, def-

ici ts in "input-output" perceptual-memory-motor channels are the bases
of learning

disabilities~

An example of such a channel might be: visual

input--visual memory association--manual expression output.

This chan-

nel would be utilized, for example, in the following sequence: seeing
a hammer, recognizing it as a hammer, making an "internal association"
with a nail, and then picking up a nail from a group of objects. 2
Although most proponents of this explanatory model suppose that
the "channels" are actually neurophysiological in nature, it is not neeessary to regard them as such.
~

One could argue, for example, that a

channel is merely a hypothetical chain of events; a temporal analysis
of an act of cognition.
Because of its presumed dependence on neurophysiology, and because of its early espousal by physicians, the channel model characteristically uses the medical idiom.

For example, the term 'agnosia' means

1Reported by Professor Harold M. Scholl, Department of Communication
Sciences and Disorders, Montclair State College during a professional
conference he conducted in Chicago on May 6, 1976.
2

Le:rner, Children with Learning Disabilities, pp. 136-198.

the inability to obtain information through an input sense organ even
though that organ is not physiologically defective.

Auditory agnosia,

for example, is the inability to recognize sounds even though the sounds
are heard.

A person may thus hear a barking dog, that is, turn his head

toward the stimulus, but not be able to recognize the sound as the bark
of a dog.

The prefix 'dys', meaning diseased, is commonly used to de-

scribe the various disabilities, for example:
dyslexia - inability to read
dysgraphia - inability to write legibly
dyscalculia - inability to arithmetically compute
dysfunctional channel - inability to effectively use an inputoutput channel
Terms such as 'dyslexia' in the federal definition thus reveal the biases
of the select committee who formulated the de jure definition.
Some advocates of this view (especially Kephart) emphasize the
motoric basis of all learning.

Accordingly, abilities such as space-

time orientation and figure-ground differentiation originate at the haptic and kinesthetic levels.

Auditory and visual figure-ground differ-

entiation, for example, rely on the child first being able to selectively attend to one somatic sensation to the exclusion of others.
view, temporal orientation also arises from motoric learning.

By this
For ex-

ample, the child learns to differentiate past, present, and future by
differentiating his movements from a former position in space to a new
position in space (as in walking a balance beam).
view are the natural theoretic consorts of Piaget.

The adherents of this
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Dissatisfaction with the channel model arises mainly from two
difficulties: misidentificaf.i.on and dissatisfaction with remediation
results.
1. misidentification - Poor performance on a perceptual-motormemory test is insufficient evidence of a learning disability.
Further confirmation is required in the form of "clinical
judgment" (introducing the undesirable element of subjectivity
into the identification process).

Kirk, for example, warns

that low scores on his ITPA merely enable one to establish a
tentative "diagnostic hypothesis" (on somewhat tenuous grounds).

1

2. efficacy of channel remediation activities - There is no evidence that channel remediation exercises result in improved
academic achievement.

Channel remediation studies indicate

that such training procedures do not "significantly improve"
readiness skills, intelligence, academic achievement, or even
perceptual-motor performance. 2
Summary
'Ihe field of lea:z:ning disability is laden with definitional confusion and competing models of explanation.

As a result, there is chaos

at the schoolhouse level manifesting itself as misidentification, ineffectual remediation techniques, and professional anxiety and insecurity.
'Ihe task at hand, therefore, is to propose an explanatory model
which generates an operational definition of learning disability and
1 Sam.uel A. Kirk and Winifred D. Kirk, Psycholinguistic Learning Disabilities: Diagnosis and Remediation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1971), p. 73,
2Janet W. Lerner, 'Iheories, Diagnosis, Teaching Strategies: Children
with Lea:rning Disabilities, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
p. 154.

1976),
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which produces the following results:
1. unites or eliminates competing models
2. provides a method which increases the probability of correct
identification (over the present methods)

3. generates effective remediation strategies

CHAPTER IV
FORMULATING A PREDICTIVE HYPOTHESIS:
THE SEMIOTICAL MODEL OF
LANGUAGE DISABILITY

In this chapter it will be argued that the three models of lea:rning disability discussed in the previous chapter can be reduced to a single model.

Also a fourth, language model will be introduced which dis-

places the other models by providing better identification criteria and
more effective remediation strategies.

Finally, a testable hypothesis

will be advanced which is based on the language model.
In the previous chapter the following three models were explored:
1. the neurological model
2. the perceptual model

3. the input-output channel model
It is theoretically possible to reduce the second and third explanatory
models to the first model by defining the crucial terms of the second
and third models (for example, 'auditory discrimination' and

1

perceptual-

motor-memory channel') to the basic terms of the first model (for example,
'neuron' and 'intemeural hormone').

The resulting reduction would mere-

ly explain perception and channel input-output in terms of neurophysiology.

51

52
Until the science of neurology completes the reduction, educators
are left with the original three sets of identification criteria and remediation

strategies~

Is there an identification criterion of leailling disability which
is more predictive of leailling disability than the criteria associated.
with the three existing explanations?
In the previous chapter, the following definition of leaining
disability was tentatively proposed: a disorder in the process involved.
in understanding or in using language.

As previously noted, this pro-

posal has the effect of taking 'leaining disability' to mean semiotical
disorder.

If we hypothesize that language disorder (sign process de-

ficiency) is a sufficient identification criterion for learning disability, a companion hypothesis is also suggested.: remediation of leaining disability should occur at the language level rather than, for example, at the perceptual-memory-motor level.
Since science is beginning to explain language disorder and language acquisition in terms of neurophysiology, we could also hypothesize
that the semiotical model of lea:rning disability is also reducible to the
neurological model.

However, the neurophysiological investigation of

language is in an infant stage of development and, therefore, science is
yet unable to completely explain language disorder in neurophysiological
terms.
As a result of cortical mapping, it is believed that the language
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function resides within the left hemisphere of the brain.

1

One of the

fundamental principles of biology is that function is related to structure.

'Iherefore, since in the human organism a unique structural char.
acteristic has developed: the hemispherical brain (the "two brain phenomenon ") , it can be assumed that some specialized functions may correspond to this specialized structure.

One of these functions is be-

lieved to be language (and, moreover, thought).

2

When science is able to explain the relationship between language and neurophysiology, the transformational grammarians may at last
be able to point to an organic structure or process which corresponds
to their now hypothetical "language acquisition device."

'Ihe hemis-

phericity of the human brain may also suggest the specialized biological
structure which underlies the species specific, self-other dichotomy
(Mead's "internalized conversation of gestures").
'Ihere is evidence that lack of hemispheric dominance is related
to language disorder.

In

1975 Marin and Saffran demonstrated, for ex-

ample, that sensory deficits cannot account for agnosic behavior.

'Iheir

findings indicate that pathologies in cortical, hemispheric specialization account for agnosia.3
1Robert D. Nebes, ·~rain: Right Hemisphere, Man's So-called Minor
Hemisphere," Journal of Leaming Disabilities 8 (December 1975):626-628.
2Ibid,
3oscar S. M. Marin and Eleanor M. Saffran, "Anomia: Pathological
Verbal Dominance," Journal of Leaming Disabilities 8 (December 197 5):

624-625.
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Several questions are suggested by this initial research.

For

example, do verbal tasks mainly involve the left hemisphere, whereas the
so-called nonverbal tasks (such as the tasks that are presented on nonverbal IQ tests) mainly involve the right hemisphere?

Robert Nebes has

already submitted evidence that the right hemisphere is a more important
factor in "intelligence" than the left hemisphere.

1

Here we may at last

find a physicalist basis for the ability-performance dichotomy.
At this point, however, there is not sufficient empirical evidence of correlation between learning disability and cerebral dominance
pathology to infer a causal relationship.

2

Correlational evidence has

thus far been generally limited to specific language disorders such as
phonematic perceptual dysfunction and specific, motoric output dysfunction. 3
Although the semiotical model of lea:r:ning disability suggests a
neurological basis, it still may be left as an open question whether
the "cause" of language disability is, wholly or in part, a neurological
pathology.
1 Robert D. Nebes,. ''Brain: Right Hemisphere, Man's So-called Minor
Hemisphere," Journal of Learning Disabilities 8 (December 197.5) :626-628.
2Manuel R. Gomez, "Neurological Approach to Specific Language Disability," paper presented at the meeting of the Capital Area Branch of
the Orton Society, Washington, D. C. , May 2, 1970 and published in the
Orton Society Reprint Series, no. 30 (Pomfret, Conn.: Orton Society,
1970), p. 27.
3Richard L. Masland, ''Brain Mechanisms Underlying the Language Function," address given at the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Orton
Society, October 28, 1966, Rockefeller University, New York and published in the Orton Society Reprint Series, no. 18 (Towson, Md.: Orton
Society, 1967), pp. 1-30.
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Empirical evidence for the relationship between lea:rning disability and language disorder is indirectly derived from remediation,
efficacy studies and from comparative studies of the language repertories
of lea:rning disabled children and

normal

children rather than from

neurological investigations.
For example, efficacy studies have shown that lea:rning disabled
students are most effectively remediated by improving their language
ability.

Harold Scholl reported that in such a recent study, four groups

of lea:rning disabled students were treated as follows:
1. control group - given no special remediation
2. channel group - given perceptual-memory-motor training

3. perceptual group - given perceptual training
4. language group - given intensive language training
At the end of the experiment, only the language group showed significanct
'h in
. ac ad emic
. ach"ievemen t • 1

grow~

In November, 1975, Elisabeth Wiig and Eleanor Semel of Boston
University conducted similar research conce:rning the relationship between
lea:rning disability and language.

They found more expressive language

deficits in lea:rning disabled children than were exhibited by the
mal

peer group.

nor-

2

1Reported by Professor Harold M. Scholl, Department of Communication
Sciences and Disorders, Montclair State College during a professional
conference he conducted in Chicago on May 6, 1976.
2 ELisabeth H. Wiig and Eleanor M. Semel, "Productive Language Abilities in Lea:rning Disabled Adolescents," J oumal of Lea:rning Disabilities
8 (November 1975):578.

r
Their research was limited to adolescent expressive language production and did not attempt to measure receptive, nonverbal, or pragmatic
aspects of semiotic.

Their study must be praised, however, for including

the prosodic characteristics of language (musical aspects).
One of their observations is especially noteworthy:
There remains • • • a paucity of investigations which further explore the nature and extent of the reported deficits •
no single, standardized test incorporated tasks sensitive to all • • •
language abilities.1
Suppose, however, that we were able to construct an exhaustive
language test "Which measured all aspects of language repertory.

The re-

sulting raw scores would probably distribute themselves normally (in the
normal curve sense).

We might subsequently classify learning disabled

children in one of two ways:
1. as all children in a specified age range who obtain a score
lower than a particular raw score on the test

2. as all children in a specified age range who fall below a particular percentile
Accepting either of these operational definitions of 'learning
disability' would have the advantage of implying remediation.

'!he first

definition has the advantage of eventually allowing educators to eradicate learning disability from a group.

Accepting the second definition,

however, has the effect of forever having learning disabled children
with us.
1

Ibid., pp. 578-579.
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Both definitions allow a new perspective of learning
remediation, exceptionality, and general education.

disab~lity,

Accordingly, from

the point of view of the linguistic turn, the only difference between
LD child.ren and non-LD children is a difference of degree in their semiotical competence.

Adopting the linguistic ontology suggests a similar

distinction between all exceptional children and their normal

peers.

From this point of view, labels lose much of their significance and the
task of education becomes: increasing the semiotical competence of all
students,
The preceding analysis suggests the following hypothesis: learning disabled children generally exhibit a lower level of language proficiency than their normal

peers,

There are at least two ways of form-

ulating this hypothesis in the form of a test-conditions-test-results
conditional:
1, If a set of children has been partitioned into two groups, LD
and non-LD, according to traditional methods (such as IQ-achievement discrepancy; low performance on identification tests such
as the VMI, ITPA, and Bender; and professional consensus) then
the incidence of language disorders in the LD group will be
greater than the incidence of language disorders in the non-LD
group.
2. If a set of children has been partitioned as designated above
then low performance on language tests will be a better discriminator of the LD trait than low performance on traditional
identification tests.

r
I

The hypothesis can be tested in at least one of two ways:
,

1. An ex post facto analysis of performance on tests which are
considered to be "language-free" compared with performance on
tests which are judged to be relatively language dependent.
Since no test is truly language-free, there is an ever present
problem of contamination using this method.
2. A comparative study of the performance of LD and non-LD students
on an objective test which is designed to assess semiotical repertory.

Unfortunately, no test presently exists which compre-

hensively measures all semiotical aspects, including nonverbal
and pragmatic aspects.
The role of philosophy in solving the problem of leaniing disability has now been demonstrated.

The definitions and theories of

leaniing disability have been philosophically analyzed.

Also, a lin-

guistic ontology has been postulated which promises to be productive in
terms of identification and remediation.

In short, the problem of leani-

ing disability should thus be in a more science-acceptable form.

There-

fore, the question of leaniing disability can now be handed over to empirical science.

r
CHAPTER V
TESTING A HYPOTHESIS:
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF LANGUAGE COMPETENCE
IN NORMAL AND LEARNING DI SABLED CHILDREN

Introduction
The following exploratory study was conducted to verify (confirm
or disconfirm) the hypothesis that language competence is a better differentiator between learning disabled children and normal children than
perceptual-motor-memory competence.
As pointed out in the previous chapters, many schools are faced
with the problem of inaccurate identification of learning disabled
children. 1

Traditional methods have differentiated between normal and

learning disabled children by the use of perceptual-motor-memory tests
(for example, the Frostig Test) and have attempted to remediate the
identified learning disabled children through the implementation of
perceptual-motor-memory training activities such as Frostig exercises.
However, these traditional methods of identification and remediation
1 Samuel A. Kirk and John Elkins, "Characteristics of Children Enrolled in the Child Service Demonstration Centers," Journal of Learning
Disabilities 8 (November 1975):630-637,
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appear unsatisfactory because efficacy studies have revealed the ineffectiveness of such methods. 1
Recently, researchers such as Elisabeth Wiig have found evidence
that learning disability generally manifests itself as a language de2
. .
f iciency.

These researchers maintain that remediation of lea:rning dis-

ability should focus on improving language competence.
In the present investigation it is expected that if a group of
learning disabled children and a group of normal children were both
given a language test and a perceptual-motor-memory test, the language
test would be a better differentiator between the two groups than the
perceptual-motor-memory test.

The purpose of the present exploratory

study is to tentatively establish that the language model (that is,
the semiotical model) of learning disability is effective in identifying learning disabled children.

If learning disabled children do,

in fact, exhibit language deficiencies then an apparent remediation
prescription is to improve the language competence of such children.
The general hypothesis to be tested is that language competence is
~a better differentiator between learning disabled children and normal

1

Ronald P. Colarusso, Hannah Martin, and Joseph Hartung, "Specific
Visual Perceptual Skills as Long-Term Predictors of Academic Success,"
Journal of Lea:rning Disabilities 8 (December 1975):651-655;and Stephen
C. Larsen, Dorothy Rogers, and Virginia Sowell, "The Use of Selected
Perceptual Tests in Differentiating between Normal and Learning Disabled
Children," Joumal of Learning Disabilities 9 (February 1976) :85-89.
2

Elisabeth H. Wiig and Eleanor M. Semel, "Productive Language Abilities in Leaming Disabled Adolescents," Journal of Learning Disabilities
8 (November 1975):578.
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children than perceptual-motor-memory competence.
METHOD
Hypotheses Tested
'Ihe principal purpose of this study was to test the following
hypotheses:
Given a group of normal subjects and a matched group of learning
disabled subjects:
1. 'Ihe mean score of the normal subjects on a language test
(the Preschool Language Scale) will be significantly greater
than the mean score of the learning disabled subjects.
2. The normal subjects will obtain a significantly higher mean
vocabulary age on a standardized vocabulary test (the Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Test) than the learning disabled subjects.
3. The label "learning disabled" will correlate significantly
more highly to low scores on the language test (Preschool
Language Scale) than to low scores on perceptual-motormemory tests (such as the Purdue Perceptual-Motor Survey).
Subjects
'Ihree hundred and ninety-seven subjects were selected from four~teen

first grade classrooms in an upper middle class suburban school

district.

Mentally retarded, physically impaired, emotionally dis-

turbed, bilingual, non-English speaking, hearing impaired, and visually
handicapped subjects were excluded from the sample.
percent of the subjects were from minority groups.

Less than five
'!he mean IQ score

of the subjects was 115 (ranging from 84 to 165) as measured by the
Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test.

The lea:rning disabled subjects had

been previously diagnosed or were in the process of being referred as
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potentially learning disabled.

The ITPA, WISC, Wepman, Bender, pro-

fessional judgment, and IQ-achievement discrepancy were utilized as
criteria for learning disability diagnosis.
previous history of learning disabilities.
tion criteria,

Normal subjects had no
Utilizing the above selec-

25 subjects were identified as learning disabled and

372 were classified as normal.
Procedure
All subjects were individually given three tests: the Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Test, the Purdue Perceptual-Motor Survey, and the
Preschool Language Scale,

The first two tests are commonly used and

have professionally accepted levels of reliability and validity.

1

Instruments
The Purdue Perceptual-Motor Survey measures body image, manual
dexterity, body movement, and eye-motor coordination.
assesses channels of perceptual-motor functioning.

The test thus

The Peabody Pie-

ture Vocabulary Test, inter alia, is regarded as an assessment of a
child's vocabulary competence.
The Preschool Language Scale contains five subtests: the first
four mainly assess language competence (syntax, following directions,
vocabulary, and vocal integration).

However, the fifth subtest as-

sesses auditory-visual-sequential memory.

The Preschool Language

Scale was produced in 1969 by Luceille Werner, Director of a Title III
1 oscar Krisen Buros, ed. The Seventh Mental Measurements Yearbook
(Highland Park, New Jersey: Gryphon Press, 1972), pp. 417 and 874,

r
ESEA project entitled "Early Prevention of School Failure."
was validated as follows.

'Ihe test

'Ihe Pearson correlation coefficient com-

paring pre- and post-test scores resulted in a reliability correlation
of

.773 at a .001 level of significance.

Since the Stanford-Binet

Intelligence Test predominantly measures intellectual language functions, it was selected for a concurrent validity check.

A close sim-

ilarity exists between the content of the language inventory and the
content of the Stanford-Binet.

'Ihe Pearson correlation coefficient

comparing the language inventory raw scores with the Binet MA was
which was significant at the .001 level.

.776

1

Results
'Ihe results of the study are presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
In Table 1 we see that, as anticipated, the mean language score of the
normal group was greater than the mean language score of the learning
disabled group.
Table 2 presents the average result of computing the discrepancy
.\in months between the chronological age and the "vocabulary age"
(Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test mental age) for each subject.

For ex-

ample, if a subject has a chronological age of 71 months and the subject has a raw score on the Peabody Test which corresponds to a mental
age equivalent of

87 months, his chronological/mental age discrepancy

would be +16 months.

'Ihe +16 indicates that his vocabulary age is 16

111Preschool Language Scale Manual," (Mimeographed.) Available
from Peotone School District 207-U, 114 N. Second Street, Peotone,
Illinois 60468.
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months greater than his chronological age.

As expected, we see

t~at

the normal group exhibited a greater vocabulary competence (+15.02
months above their chronological age) than the leaming disabled group

(+3.76 months above their chronological age).

The significance of

this finding is the magnitude of the difference between the learning
disabled group's performance and the normal group's performance.

The

fact that the learning disabled group scored above their chronological
age (+3.76) would not be surprising to those who work with learning
disabled children.

One of the characteristics of such children is

that, while they often score above the fiftieth percentile (because
of high IQ or socio-economic status), they often perform significantly
lower than their normal peer group on the same test.
In Table 3, the correlations that were found between low score
on various tests and the learning disabilities attribute are presented.
As anticipated, it was found that poor performance on the language test
was better correlated to learning disability than poor performance on
the memory or perceptual-motor tests.

Therefore, language competence

~.

appears to be a better predictor of learning disability than perceptualmotor-memory competence.
TABLE 1
Results of Language Test

Group

N

25
Normal 372
LD

Language Inventory
Mean Score

Standard
Deviation

Variance

27.68
34.79

7.04
5.32

49,56
28.30

r
TABLE 2
Mean Discrepancy between Chronological Age and Vocabulary Age

Group

LD

Normal

N

Mean Discrepancy in Months
between CA and MA

Standard
Deviation

Variance

15.67
11.93

245.55
142.32

+3.76
+15.02

25
372

TABLE 3
Correlations between LD and Low Test Performance

LD

Low Score on
Language Subtests

Low Score on
Memory Subtest

.35

.19

Low Score on
Perceptual-Motor Survey

.16

The first null hypothesis tested (represented in Table 1) was
that the two mean language scores were the same.
was rejected at the
~was

.05 level of significance.

The null hypothesis
The following t-test

used because the variances were unequal and the leailling disabled

group was small (less than JO).

t

=

and
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The second null hypothesis tested (represented in Table 2) was
that the two mean discrepancies were the same.
was rejected at the

.05

The null hypothesis

level of significance by using the t-test de-

scribed above.
The third null hypothesis tested (represented in Table 3) was
that there was no difference among the correlation coefficients yielded
by the point-biserial Pearson product-moment correlation formula.
Using a two-tailed test of normal distribution, the null hypothesis
was rejected at the

.05

level of significance.

The language correla-

tion of • 35 is considered to be a "moderate" correlation whereas the
memory and perceptual-motor correlations of .19 and .16 respectively,
are considered to be "low" correlations.
In order to display the results in an additional form, Figures

1 and 2 are presented.
FIGURE 1
Mean Score on Language Survey of Each Group
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Summarizing the obtained results, we find that: learning disabled children generally do not achieve as well as normal students on
language tasks, learning disabled children generally do not have as
good a vocabulary repertory as normal children, and performance on
language tests yieldsa better correlation to leaming disability than
performance on perceptual-motor-memory tests.
Discussion
The results of this study offer support for the general hypo~.thesis

that language competence is a good predictor of learning disabil-

ity and a better predictor than the traditional criterion of perceptualmotor-memory competence.
It should be noted that al though the evldence produced by this
study supports the semiotical theory of learning disability, confinnation of the semiotical theory is limited by at least three verification
difficulties.

Fi~st,

the tests used do not comprehensively measure

semiotical functioning (including semantic, syntactic, pragmatic, pro-
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sodic, and nonverbal factors).

Secondly, there is an inherent contam-

ination problem in language and nonlanguage tests.

The perceptua.1-

motor-memory tests depend on language, if only in the establishment
of the directions.

Also, the language tests clearly depend on memory,

perception, and motor components.

Thirdly, partitioning a group of

students into learning disabled and normal subgroups is an uncertain
process at best, often resulting in the identification of false positives and false negatives.

Therefore, any attempt to accurately

coITelate learning disability to test performance is limited by the
accuracy of the given partitioning process.
It is recognized that additional statistical testing (for example, partial coITelation analyses) could have been conducted.

How-

ever, due to the limitations of the exploratory nature of this study,
such analyses were not conducted.

Based on the exploratory data re-

ported here, however, it appears that further statistical testing is
waITanted.
Conclusion
The verification of the semiotical theory of learning disability now rests upon weak empirical evidence.

As further positive evi-

dence is collected, the probability in favor of the truth of the semiotical hypothesis will increase,

The scientist and philosopher will

err, however, the moment that they delude themselves or others into
unconditional or final acceptance of this or any other hypothesis.
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Bertrand Russell, a philosopher who spent much of his life exploring the foundations of mathematics (supposedly the most certain of
all knowledge), once observed:
No one should be certain of anything. If you are certain, you
are certainly wrong, because nothing deserves certainty.1
This problem of certainty thus brings us to the limits of philosophy
in general and to the limits of philosophy in education.
1

Russell, Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind, p. 14.

We must do away with all explanation and
description alone must take its place.
Investigations (109)

CHAPTER VI
REFLECTING ON THE LANDSCAPE:
THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY IN EDUCATION

This work will be concluded by reviewing 'What has been presented
in the previous chapters and by reflecting upon the inherent limitations
of philosophy in education.
A new role for philosophy in education was explored through a
partial reconstruction of philosophy, the history of philosophy, and
various educational disciplines on the basis of "the linguistic tum"
which was described as: the ontological attitude that language is the
basis for all reality,
It was shown how taking the linguistic tum suggests a new
criterion of meaning which displaces the empiricist criterion of meaning.

It was further shown how adopting the linguistic tum can result

in postulating: a new definition of 'man'; a new distinction between
science and the humanities; and a reinterpretation of the value and
meaning of metaphysics, theology, and religion.
In the process of exploring "metaphysical semantics" a neurophysiological basis was suggested for Mead's internalized self-other
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dichotomy and a confirmation-falsification reduction was proposed for
'God exists' •
A paradigm application of the linguistic tu:rn in education was
presented.

The example field was special education and learning dis-

ability in particular.

The analysis included a critique of the current

federal de jure definition of lea:rning disability as well as the de facto
definition of learning disability presently used by the practitioners in
the field.
Three competing theories of lea:rning disability were examined and
a fourth was proposed: that learning disability can be described as an
"unacceptable" level of semiotical proficiency with respect to the continuum of semiotical proficiencies exhibited by a reference population.
Finally, a predictive hypothesis was proposed concerning the relationship between language and learning disability.

The problem of

learning disability was then handed over to empirical science.

Handing

over the problem to science brings us to the limit of philosophy. What
is the limit of philosophy in education?

An art critic might point out that baroque painting typically
has a diagonal organization of its elements extending into the background of the painting.

The art critic is not thereby pointing out

something that was literally hidden from us previously.
opher is much like this art critic because:

The philos-
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The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden
because of their simplicity and familiarity. Philosophy simply,
puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to
explain. For what is hidden , •• is of no interest to us.1
When philosophy places everything before us, it does so from a new perspective.
seen.

Only the perspective is new, not the elements of what is

The new perspective is a description of things already before us,
Wittgenstein's metaphor suggests the limit of philosophy in

education.

The descriptive function of philosophy is also its limit.

Metaphysical "explanation" is not explanation in the empirical sense
(prediction and postdiction).

Metaphysical description is a metaphor-

ical representation of those things that transcend public experience.
Since it was the intent of this study to propose for education
a description of a linguistic ontology, a system of metaphysical semantics, and the limits of language and thought then everything said which
was of value in realizing this goal was said metaphorically and not
designatively {empirically).
11udwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G, E. M.
Anscombe {New York: Macmillan Co., 1953), p, ,50e.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Philosophy and Linguistics
Austin, J, L, "Pretending," Essays in Philosophical Psychology, Etli ted by
Donald F. Gustafson. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1964.
Carnap, Rudolf. "Testability and Meaning," Readings in the Philosophy of
Science, Etlited by Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck. New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953,
Engel, S, Morris. Wittgenstein's Doctrine of the Tyranny of Language:. An
Historical and Critical Examination of His Blue Book. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
Flew, Antony. "Theology and Falsification." The Existence of God, Etlited
by John Hick. New York: Macmillan Co., 1964.
Lipman, Matthew; Sharp, Ann Margaret; and Oscanyan, Frederick S. Philosophy in the Classroom. West Caldwell, N. J.: Universal Diversified
Services, 1977,
McNeil, David. The Acquisition of Language: The Study of Developmental
Psycholinguistics. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
Mead, George H. Mind, Self, and Society. Etlited and with an Introduction
by Charles W. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962,
Penelhum, Terence, "The Logic of Pleasure. 11 Essays in Philosophical
Psychology. Etlited by Donald F. Gustafson. New York: Doubleday &
Co., 1964.
"Results of 197 5 Experimental Research in Philosophy for Children, 11
(Mimeographed.)
Russell, Bertrand. Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind. Compiled by the
Hearst Corporation. New York: Hearst Corporation, 1960.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue and Brown Books. New York: Harper & Bros.,

1958.
____ • Notebooks. Edited by G. H. von Wright. and G. E. M. Anscombe.
Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: Harper & Row, 1961.

73

74
____ • Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe.
New York: Macmillan Co., 1953.
____ • Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by D. F. Pears and
B. F.• McGuinness. With an Introduction by Bertrand Russell. New
York: 'Ihe Humanities Press, 1961.
____ • Zettel. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright.
Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1967.
Lea:rning Disability
Bengelsdorf, Irving S. "'Ihe Brain and Nervous System in Lea:rning and
Memory." 'Ihe Education Digest (December 1975):19-22.
Colarusso, Ronald P.; Martin, Hannah; and Hartung, Joseph. "Specific Visual Perceptual Skills as Long-Term Predictors of Academic Success."
Jou:rnal of Lea:rning Disabilities 8 (December 1975):651-55.
Dunn, Lloyd M. "Special Education for the Mildly Retarded: Is Much of It
Justifiable?" An Empirical Basis for Change in Education. Edited by
Wesley C. Becker. Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1971.
Federal Register 41 (November 29, 1976).
Gomez, Manuel R. Neurological Approach to Specific La.nguag.e Disability.
Orton Society Reprint Series, no. 30. Pomfret, Conn.: Orton Society,

1970.

Keller, Helen. 'Ihe Story of My Life. New York: Dell, 1961.
Kenney, Eleanor T. "Lea:rning Disability: What It Is and Is Not." Educational Leadership JoUin.al of the Association for Supervision and
~
Curriculum Development 32 (May 1975):507-10.
Kirk, Samuel A., and Elkins, John. "Characteristics of Children Ehrolled
in the Child Service Demonstration Centers." Journal of Lea:rning
Disabilities 8 (November 1975):630-37.
Kirk, Samuel A., and Kirk, Winifred D. Psycholinguistic Learning Disabilities: Diagnosis and Remediation. Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1971.
Larsen, Stephen C.; Rogers, Dorothy; and Sowell, Virginia. "'Ihe Use of
Selected Perceptual Tests in Differentiating Between Normal and
Learning Disabl.ed Children." J ou:mal of Learning Disabilities 9
(February 1976):85-90.

75
Lerner, Janet W. Theories, Diagnosis, Teaching Strategies: Children with
Learning Disabilities. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,,1976,
Marin, Oscar S. M., and Saffran, Eleanor M. "Anomia: Pathological Verbal
Dominance, 11 Journal of Learning Disabilities 8 (December 197 5):
624-25.
l1asland, Richard L. Brain Mechanisms Underlying the Language Function.
Orton Society Reprint Series, no. 18, Towson, Md.: Orton Society,
1967,
Nebes, Robert D. "Brain: Right Hemisphere, Man's So-called Minor Hemisphere. " J oumal of Learning Disabilities 8 (December 197 5) : 626-28.
"Preschool Language Scale Manual." (Mimeographed,)
Scholl, Harold M. Professor, Department of Communication Sciences and
Disorders. Montclair State College, Professional Conference
held in Chicago on May 6, 1976.
Senf, Gerald M.; Luick, Anthony H.; and Sawyer, Beverly P. "State Initiative in Learning Disabilities: Illinois' Project SCREEN."
Journal of Learning Disabilities 8 (November 1975): 587-96.
West, Terry, and Millsom, Carol. "Learning Disabilities Funding.
Journal of the Assoc.iation for Su ervision and Curriculum D9velopment 32 May 1975 :503-50 •
11

Wiig, Elisabeth H., and Semel, Eleanor M. "Productive Language Abilities
in Learning Disabled Adolescents." Journal of Leaming Disabilities
8 (November 1975):578-86,

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Robert John Clinkert has been read
and approved by the following committee:
Rev. Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J., Director
Professor, Foundations of Etlucation, Loyola
Dr. John M. Wozniak
Professor, Foundations of Etlucation and
Dean, School of Etlucation, Loyola
Dr. Ronald R. Morgan
Assistant Professor, Foundations of Etlucation, Loyola
The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation
and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary
changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given
final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

1, 117 7

76

